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MARRIAGE AND LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION IN JAP&"l 
by Kathryn H. Anderson and M. Anne Hill 
One determinant of lower population growth is a decrease in the 
total fertility rate. Fertility can be changed not only by reducing 
marital fertility at every age but also by changing the pattern of 
nuptiality. Lesthaegne (1971) fit the "standard" nuptiality curve 
developed by Coale (1971) to Middle Eastern data and found that nup­
tiality changes produce the same effect on population growth as changes 
in marital fertility. He found, for example, that if the minimum age 
of marriage in Turkey is raised from 13,5 to 16 years, perhaps as the 
result of a government decree, fertility declines of 15 percent are 
expected. Similar results are derived from a simulation study by 
Menken and Bongaarts (1979) in which the total fertility rate declines 
from 9.31 to 7.85 if the age at marriage rises from 20 years to 20.3 
years. 
To determine under what conditions a change in the age at mar­
riage can be expected, demographers and economists have analyzed house­
hold behavior. Demographic literature examines socioeconomic differ­
entials in fertility without actually modelling behavior. Bumpass 
(1969), Hogan (1978), Dixon (1971), and others find significant dif­
ferences in age at marriage by religion, area of residence (urban/ 
rural), educational level, wealth, occupation, and family type. 
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Economic work on marriage by Keeley and Becker views marriage 
within the framework of choice. Keeley (1977, 1979) models the pro­
cess of searching for a mate, emphasizing the costs of search. A 
single person must decide whether to enter the marriage market and, 
upon entering, how long to search. An optimal sequential search pro­
cess is pursued if he enters the marriage market. The costs of search 
depend on the value of time and the prices of goods purchased during 
the search. From the model, women are expected to marry later if the 
female wage increases relative to the male wage, causing the net gain 
to marriage to fall. F.Jnpirical results support most of the model's 
predictions. 
In Becker's (1973, 1974) theory of marriage, marriage occurs if 
the benefits from marriage exceed the costs. In other words, the indi­
vidual's share of marital income must exceed the maximum output pro­
ducible in a single household for marriage to occur. Gains to marriage 
depend on wage and non-wage income when married and single, the prices 
of purchased inputs used in the production of household commodities, and 
the efficiency of household production. If the husband aa~d wife's time 
in home production are complementary or there are economies of scale in 
production in the married household, the gain to marriage increases 
relative to the cost. Becker does not empirically test his model, 
but Friedan (1974) does find some support for the importance of economic 
variables in determining the proportion of females married. If the dif­
ference in the male and female wage rates is large (indicating some com­
plementarity between male and female household time), the proportion of 
women marrying increases. An increase in wealth or technological change 
in the home results in an increase in marriage. 
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The major problem with t~e economic household models of marriage 
is that no unambiguous predictions are readily derivable without placing 
some structure on the form of the home production functions. In addition, 
as Wallace (1974) points out, the models are deterministic, and implications 
concerning the "likelihood" of ever-marrying require a stochastic frame­
work. The empirical estimation of marriage equations also requires 
improvement. In particular, separate measures of full labor and non-
labor wealth are needed to adequately estimate the wealth and wage 
effects. 
Our paper on marriage begins with the development of an economic 
model of the decision to marry based on Becker's model and placing some 
structure on the form of the production functions. In the second sec­
tion, we present a stochastic model of the age at marriage derived from 
our marriage model. In the third section, by applying rationing theory, 
we demonstrate how outlawing a Japanese practice requiring married women 
to withdraw from the paid labor force affects the optimal age at marriage. 
Finally, our mo<lel of the age at marriage is tested in the last section 
using data from Japan. 
1. THE DECISION TO MARRY 
Our model of the decision to marry is derived from Becker (1973) 
and Wallace (1974). At some point in an individual's life, he makes the 
decision to marry or to remain single. In order to make this decision, 
he compares the maximum lifetime utility attainable in marriage with the 
maximum lifetime utility attainable in the single state and chooses to 
marry only if the utility expected in marriage is larger. 
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We are interested in the individual's decision to marry rather than 
the joint decision of two potential spouses, and we are abstracting from 
search for a mate. The individual begins with knowledge of his utility func­
tion as a single person, the characteristics of the potential spouse, and 
the objective function of the married household. Given this information, 
each individual can ascertain the optimal utility that he can achieve in the 
married household as well as the single household. The utility function is 
separable and composed of two cormnodities--N and Z--which are produced in 
the home. The commodity Z may be viewed as a group of commodities, 
the production of which is less costly in the single household. For 
example, Z may be privacy--its cost increases where a spouse contri-
butes time to its production. N m~y be, for example, child services 
which are produced at lower cost in the married household. The dif­
ference between the two utility functions depends on differences in the 
production functions for Zand N and the budget constraints in each 
state. 
In the single woman's household, Zand N are produced with inputs 
of her time and market goods. In the married household, Z. and N are 
produced with her time, her husband's time, and market goods. If the 
production functions are linear homogeneous, then the shadow prices of 
Zand N are easily derived as weighted linear function~ of the input 
prices--the value of the wife's time (WW), the value of the husband's 
time (WH), and the prices of goods used in production (PXZ and P~). 
The single woman's full income is the sum of her unearned income 
(VW) and her full time (T) evaluated at her market wage (WWT). Full 
income is spent on purchases of goods and time used in the production 
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of z and N. In the married household, full income is augmented by her 
husband's unearned income (VH) and his full time evaluated at his mar­
ket wage (WHT). VW and VH include intergenerational transfers of wealth 
and human capital including inheritances. 
To determine whether or not marriage is optimal, the single woma:n 
compares the optimal utility within marriage to the optimal utility in 
the single household. Utility in each state is maximized subject to 
the full income and production constraints. The optimal quantities of 
Zand N are derived as functions of wages, prices, and income. Optimal 
Zand N are then substituted back into the utility functions and the 
* *
indirect utilities within marriage and the single state (UM and US) are 
obtained. If UM* is greater than US,* marriage is optimal. 
*greater than UM' remaining single is optimal. 
The indirect utilities are derived in Appendix A. From the model, 
the following implications are obtained. First, the higher the husband's 
nonearnings income, the higher the gain to marriage. Second, higher 
non-earnings income for the wite implies a lower gain to marriage if 
the weighted share of her wealth in a single household exceeds the 
weighted share of her wealth in a married household. Third, if the 
income elasticities of demand for N and Z exceed the elasticity of 
substitution between N and Z, then an increase in the wife's wage 
will likely result in a decrease in the gain from marriage. 
Finally, if the husband's time share in the production of Z is larger 
than his time share in the production of Nin the married household, 
then an increase in the husband's wage will likely increase the gain 
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to marriage. 
This model examines the motivations of an individual woman who 
is considering marriage. It can be assumed that a single man's be­
havior is modelled identically. His optimal lifetime utility attain­
able within marriage is compared to his optimal utility as a single 
person. Marriage is optimal to him if the gain from marriage 
(UM* - U* 5) is positive. Marriage actually occurs when the gain for 
both prospective spouses is positive. 
2. THE AGE AT MARRIAGE 
From the model derived in the previous section, an individual 
marries at some point in his life if the optimal utility attainable 
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from marriage exceeds the optimal utility attainable from remaining 
single •. Suppose, 
that the utility function consists of a non-stochastic component 
(U)* and some stochastic component (e) which measures individual 
tastes, for example: 
(3a) 
(3b) 
Then the probability of ever-marrying (PEM) during the lifetime is 
positively related to the gain·from marriage. 
(4) 
As the gains from marriage increase, the probability of ever-marrying 
and, therefore, the fraction of the lifetime married increases. The 
fraction of the lifetime married represents the probability of ever­
marrying: 
T - A
(5) PEl-1 = T 
Rearranging, age at marriage is shown as a decreasing function of PEM: 
(6) 
Consequently, those variables that increase the gain from marriage and 
the probability of ever-marrying will systematically decrease the age 
at marriage. 
This modelling requires several comments and caveats. First, we 
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are abstracting from intertemporal variation in utility for both 
married and single households. The gain from production in a married 
household obviously changes with the value of time over the life-cycle. 
Second, this model allows no marital dissolution. While inappropriate 
for the U.S., this assumption appears reasonable given information for 
all Japan and our sample. In both our sample and all Japan, fewer 
2
than three percent of all women over thirty had ever divorced. 
3. THE SETTING IN JAPAN 
Japan provides a very interesting setting for a study of the age 
at marriage, In 1947, with the American Occupation, the Civil Code was 
revised to assure women equal property rights, freedom of marriage, and 
3
equal grounds for divorce. At the same time the Labor Standards Law 
guaranteed equal pay for equal work. The extent to which these rights 
were enforced is suspect. In 1965, a government survey of firms in­
dicated that 9.4 percent had formal rules requiring retirement of women 
upon their marriage. with 7.5 percent of the firms admitting informal 
practice of compulsory retirement. In 27.9 percent of the surveyed 
firms, female employees were subject to different retirement age rules 
than male employees. In 1966, the District Court of Tokyo ruled that 
the compulsory retirement practiced by a Japanese cement company 
4 
violated the provisions of the Civil Code. This ruling reenforced the 
2Japan. Prime Ministers Office. Japan Statistical Yearbook (1975), 
and survey data. 
3 Lebra et al. (1976, p. 20). 
4 Cole (1971) p. 147. 
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freedom to marry, allowing greater flexibility in the age at marriage to 
women marrying after 1966. 
The practice of compulsory retirement from the paid sector upon 
marriage can have differential effects on three groups of women. In the 
absence of this practice, these affected groups are: 
(1) married women, (2) sinple women who are not working, and (3) single 
women who are paid labor force participants. 
If there _is no option of divorce, this practice is pro-natalist 
for the first group of women. Compulsory retirement from the paid labor 
force essentially rations hours of work in the paid sector. This practice 
reduces the "ration" of market time and increases the "ration" of time in 
other activities. This ration can be viewed symmetrically as a reduction 
in the wage married women can receive in the paid labor force. If discrimina­
tion is completely effective, this wage is literally driven to zero. As a 
result, the real value of time foregone in the market in order to raise 
children declines and the desired number of children increases, 
The second group of women affected by this practice are single women 
who are not working. In this ca6 e, the value of their time in the home 
exceeds the market wage before the practice is established so that the most 
efficient use of their time is in home production. Upon marriage, the 
behavior of these women is the same (with or without the law) as long as 
the marginal product of their labor after marriage does not fall below their 
premarriage war,e. The same result is expected for women who would withdraw 
from the labor force upon marriage in the absence of this practice. In this 
case, marginal product in the home increases with marriage to a point above 
-10-
th~ market wage; the optimal allocation of their time includes no time in 
paid employment. 
The third group of affected women consists of working sinr,le women who 
would marry in the absence of compulsory retirement. These women have two 
choices. If they remain single, they can earn a market wage equal to the 
value of their time in the home by allocating time both to the market 
and to home production. If they marry, their actual market wage falls to 
zero which is less than their market wage if they did not marry. If all 
gains from marriage remain constant, this practice reduces the net benefit of 
marriage.women choose to delay marriage beyond the age which is optimal 
without compulsory retirement. The effect on this group of women is anti­
natalist since their period of potential childbearing is shortened, 
Compulsory retirement upon marriage imposes a welfare loss on women 
in groups one and three. In the absence of the practice, time is ef-
ficiently allocated between home production and the paid labor force until 
the marginal product of time in the home is equal to the market wage. If 
market time is rationed so that the number of hours spent in the paid 
labor force is less than the number of unrationed hours, the marginal 
product of home time falls below the going market wage. This wedge 
driven between the wage and the value of home time results in a welfare 
loss to married women. For single working women contemplatinr marriage, 
this welfare loss is an additional cost of marriap,e and, consequently, 
reduces the net benefit to marriage. 
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We may express the effect of this mirket discrimination on age at 
marriage by first considering a result derived in Tobin and Houthakker 
5(1958). They show that the effect of an exogenous change in the 
quantity of the rationed commodity is equivalent to a compensated change 
in the wage: 
C
(7) nH,WW dWW 
where tHR is the rationed time in the formal sector, nc is the compen-H,WW 
sated own substitution effect, and dWW is the change in the wage. 
The effect of this ration on age at marriage then is 
(8) 1 = 
C 
comp comp n H,WW 
where 'iJA/aWwl is simply the compensated substitution effect of thecomp 
wage on age at marriage. Unfortunately, we do not have information on 
the cha~ge in the ration of market time that resulted from the court 
ruling. We do know whether a marriage took place before or after the 
court ruling; so we const~Jct 
these women married after 1966 and equals zero for women married during 
or before 1966. We consider the effect of Don age at marriage: 
(9) aA I"' aww 
. comp 
5their result generalizes readily when full income (I) is the ap­
propriate income measure. 
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Given the sign of the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable D 
in our age at marriage equation, we may then sign the compensated 
effect of a change in the wage on age at marriage. We know from demand 
theory that is positive. Also, the effect of the dummy variable 
on rationed market hours (3tw
R 
H/3D) is positive. Since both terms are 
' 
positive, the sign of 3A/awj comp 
will be the sign of the coefficient in 
the dummy variable; e.g., if 3A/oD is negative, that will indicate that 
· the compensated effect of the wage on age at marriage is also negative. 
4. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA AND VARIABLES 
The data set employed in this analysis draws from a 1975 survey of 
women 20 to 59 in the Tok)'Ometropolitan area. This survey includes in­
formation on family background and marital status as well as retrospective 
data on work experience and fertility.
6· 
Our modelling suggests a regression analysis in which the age at 
first marriage depends on the wages of the husband and the wife, their non­
wage income, and the ration of labor market time. The sample means and 
definitions of the variables used in our estimation are presented in 
Table 1. The mean age at marriage for this sample is 24 with a standard 
deviation of 3 years. Since we had no wage data for non-working womeu, 
we predicted their value of time by setting the wage equal to an instru­
mental variables prediction of the market wage if they were working in 
the paid labor force and equal to their predicted reservation wage if 
they were not working in the paid labor force. 
6 
For a complete description of these data, see Hill (1979). 
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TABLE 1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in E!npirical Woiik 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
Age of Marriage 
1
ln Wife's Hourly Wage 
(yen per hour) 
Wife's Schooling 
(years) 
ln Husband's Income 
(yen per year) 
Husband's Schooling 
(dummy variable - 1 if mother 
completed junior high school) 
ln Father's Income 
(yen per year) 
Year of Marriage 
Married after 1966 















1The 1975 exchange rate was 293.8 yen per dollar, 
hence the geometric mean wage is $1.20/hour. 
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While the husband's income was reported, his hours of work were not, 
so we have no wage measure for him. Also, income is reported for the 
husband only if he is the primary earner. We, therefore, use an instru­
mental measure of his income which unfortunately incorporates both wage 
and labor supply information. The mother's schooling and the father's 
predicted income proxy the woman's own non-wage income and transferred 
endowment of wealth and human capital. The wage and income predictions 
are presented in Appendix B. Any wage measure which is a function of the 
wife's age is predicted where the wife's age equals zero when included as 
7 a regressor. 
The year of marriage captures the secular trend in the age at first 
marriage of Japanese women. The mean year for the sample is 1961. A 
dummy variable equal to one if the woman married after 1966 is included 
to measure the response in age at marriage to the 1966 elimi.nation of com­
pulsory retirement from paid employment upon marriage. The regression 
sample was limited to those women who are currently married. 8 
Schooling of the husband and wife are included in regressions with 
and without estimates of the wage or market earnings. In many studies, 
schooling is used as a proxy for the value of time whenever information 
on wages is unavailable. However, education is closely associated with 
wealth accumulation, tastes, and efficiency in home production. Inter­
pretation of the coefficient on schooling only as a wage effect requi't"es 
restrictive assumptions concerning its other effects. 
7See Davanzo, ~ al., (1976). 
8Estimates excluding women married before the end of World War II 
resulted in little change in the values of the estimated coefficients and 
an overall decline in statistical significance. 
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TABLE 2 
Empirical Results for Age at Marriage 
1(1110 observations) 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -186.0621 -160.0812 -181.9962 -169.50 
(-6.35) (-5.68) (-6.11) (-5.94) 
ln Wife's Hourly Wage 0 .9131 0.7866 
(3.64) (1.37) 
Wife's Schooling 0.0807 0.0961 
(1.65) (2.01) 
ln Husband's Income 0.5892 -.5202 0~8443 
(0.94) (-0.90) (1.47) 
Husband's Schooling -0.9384 -0.9985 -0.8052 
(-3.6~) (-3. 79) (-3.53) 
Mother's Schooling 0.3144 o.2854 0.2945 0.3342 
{1.49) {1.34) {1.38) {1.58) 
1 n Father's Income 0.8218 0.8275 0.8092 0.8769 
{2.10) {2.10) {2.06) (2.25) 
Year of Marriage 0.0944 0.0891 0.0928 0.0919 
· (6.65) {6.28) {6 .47) (6.41) 
Married After 1966 -o .9825 -1.0522 -0.9873 -1.0307 
{-3.52) (-3.75) {-3.53) (-3. 71) 
F-s ta tis tic 10.65 10.11 10.64 12.04 
1t-statistics in parentheses. 
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the empirical results of OLS regressions for age 
at marriage for four specifications of the model. The wife's and the 
husband's schooling alternate as measures of the value of time. First, 
the effect of a change in the wife's value of time, measured as her wage 
or schooling on age at marriage is positive and significant -- the elasti­
cities evaluated at the mean are approximately .04 in each regression. 
This result implies that the income elasticities for N and Z outweigh 
the elasticity of substitution between N and Z. 
Second, when the husband's schooling is included as a regressor, 
his income increases the age at marriage, though insignificantly. When 
his level of schooling is not held constant, his income reduces the age 
at marriage. This variable is not a predicted wage or value of time but pre­
dicted earnings and, therefore, includes an endogenous labor supply effect which 
cannot be separated from the wage effect. Although the husband's level 
of schooling incorporates these same effects, the effect of a change 
in his schooling on age at marriage is negative and significant. The 
elasticity evaluated at ~ho mo~n i~ -.02. The huaband's schooling variable 
probably captures an efficiency effect as well as the negative·wealth 
effect. An increase in his level of schooling, will raise his efficiency 
in household production and unambiguously increase the gains to marriage. 
Third, the proxies for the wife's transferred endowment father's 
income and mother's schooling -- are positive and significant determinants 
of the age of marriage; the elasticity of ag~ with respect to mother's 
schooling and the elasticity of age with respect to father's income, 
evaluated at the sample means, are .005 and .035 respectively. These 
results are as predicted by the model,indicating that the share of un­
earned income in full single income is greater than the share of unearned 
income in full marital income. 
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Fourth, the year of marriage is a positive determinant of the age 
of marriage. The trend in age at marriage from 1947 to 1975 is signifi­
cantly upwards if we control for individual variation in wages and wealth. 
Finally, the court decision in 1966 forbidding discrimination in the 
employment of married women has a decidedly negative effect on age at 
marriage as expected. This result indicates that the practice of compulsory 
retirement reduced the overall welfare of married women in Japan. Recall 
that this coefficient is a function of the compensated wage effect on age 
at marriage, the compensated wage effect on hours, and the effect of the 
dummy variable on rationed hours. Since our estimated coefficient for 
3A/3D is negative, the compensated wage effect must be negative. This result 
indicates that the effect of non-wage income on age must be positive, since 
our uncompensated wage effect (the sum of the com,pensated effect and the 
income effect) is positive. Overall, the estimated effect of the dummy 
variable confirms the predictions of the model. 
The regression sample used in estimating the age at marriage equa­
tions includes only those women who are currently married. We obviously 
do not know the age of marriage for never-married women. The young 
women (20 to 30) who are currently married are not a random sample of 
their cohort. They have a higher probability of ever marrying than 
their counterpartsJ their inclusion in the sample may lead to selectivity 
bias in our results. Rather than exclude these women from the regression 
sample, we choose to test for selectivity bias by including the Mill's ratio 
correction in the estimated model. 9 
Inclusion of this correction for selectivity bias results in a slight 
9The correction was derived from a Logit estimation of the probability 
of ever-marrying. Details of the procedure are given in Hay (1979). 
Tables of the probability function and the corrected marriage regression 
are available upon request. 
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decrease in overall significance of the estimates (e.g., the F-statistic 
for the first specification in Table 2 drops from 10.65 to 9.35). The 
coefficient for the selection variable is itself insignificant, and the 
remaining coefficients change very little. Since there is virtually no 
evidence of selectivity bias, we choose to present the most significant 
empirical results -- those uncorrected for this bias. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
We have derived a model of the decision to marry based on Becker's 
model of marriage. If the utility expected from marriage exceeds the 
utility from remaining single, the individual decides to marry at some 
point in his lifetime. This decision to marry is related to the probabili­
ty of ever-marrying if the deterministic model is expanded to include 
stochastic variation in utility across individuals. In this case, the 
age at marriage becomes a negative function of the probability of ever 
marrying. 
Few unambiguous predictions are possible from this model without 
assumptions about behavior before and after marriage. In general, we 
expect the wife's age at marriage to be a positive function of her 
wage and wealth and a negative function of her husband's wage and wealth. 
The predictions are supported empirically using Japanese data. 
In addition to testing the acme production model, we are interested 
in determining the effect of legal sexual discrimination in the labor mar­
ket on the age at marriage. Applying rationing theory to explain the 
direction of effect of market discrimination on age at marriage, we pre-
dict that age at marriage declines if the legal constraint is 
removed. This prediction is supported by the data after adjusting for 
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a positive secular trend in age at marriage in Japan. Further research 
from different cultural settings such as the United States is needed to 
support the hypothesis that market discrimination against married women 
is a deterrent to marriage. 
Economic Growth r,enter, Yale University 
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APPENDIX A 
The utility function for the married household is an additive 
function of the utility of the wife within marriage and the utility 
of the husband within marriage. Marriage occurs whenever the dif­
ference between the wife's optimal utility when married and her op­
timal utility when single and the difference between the husband's 
optimal utility when married and his optimal utility when single 
are positive. 
In a single woman's household, Zand N are produced with inputs 
of her time (~, Z and ~'N) and goo.ds In the married(X~ and Xi). 
hous_ehold, Z and N are produced with inputs of the husband's time 
(tH,Z and tH,N), the wife's time (~,z and ~,N) and goods (~ and 
~). The production functions are assumed to be linear homogeneous. 
The shadow prices of Zand N are easily derived as functions of the 
input prices--the value of the wife's time (WW), the value of the 
husband's time (WH), and the prices of goods in production (PX and 
z 
PX) and are presented below. 
--w 
s M(A.l) Ens z = a EWW + ax EPXtN~Z z z 
(A.2) En
M = a EW + aM EWW + ax 
M 
EPX2 tH,Z H tW, Z z z 
(A.3) Ens == s EW + 
s 
N a~,N a~ EP~w 
M M
(A.4) EJI:: = N 0 t N EWH + a~,N EWW + a~ EP~ H'· 
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where: 
, the cost share of K = W or H 
in the production of commodity 
i = Z,N. IT~. i is the total 
cost of production r = S~ ~. 
s
Full income in the single household (I) and the married household 
(IM) is the smn of unearned income and full wage income and is spent on 
time and market goods used in the production of Zand N. The time cost 
and the value of purchased goods form the shadow prices of Zand N (rr2 
and IlN). The full income constraint is given in (A.5): 
(A.Sa) 
(A.Sb) 
The first order differentiation of the utility function in percentage 
change terms is: 
(A.6) EU= 
To compare the maximmn utility attainable in the married household with 
the maximum utility for the single household, we must evaluate (A.6) at 
the optimal values of Zs, NS and ZM, ~- Then the gain from marriage 
is: 
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eM = L and es us b h d b i . ThWhere = -- ot assume to e pos tive. eset.f1_us t/1-us , 
optimal demands may in turn be expressed as functions of full income 
(Is and Im), and the shadow prices of their production (n!, IT~, rr;, ~). 
The form of these demands is independent of the marital state. If r 
indexes the marital state and equals Sor M, then the optimal demands 
in percentage chages are: 
The factor shares and elasticities in equations (A.8) and (A.9) are 
defined as: 
o = the elasticity of substitution between Z 
and Nin consumption. 
Ei 
n = EI, the full income ~lasticity of demand1 
for i = Z,N. 
r • in1 ----- .:,~ ..........I , the budget share of 1.:UlllJ.IIU U.1. I. y 
r 
in fuli income I, r = S,µ.r 
The final expression for the gains from marriage may be derived by sub-
stituting (A.l) - (A.5) into (A.7). The final equation is: 
(A.10) 
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(eM M _ 8sys )a4 = nz Yv, Vw w 
8sI s (K~ Ks O ) s . Ks ( ) s J- nNYw + -N ~ + z at.._ N - z o-nN at z
W w, N, 
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where: 
the share of full earnings of K = W,H in full 
income I where r = S,M.T is the endowment of time. 
r 
r = the share of the non-earnings wealth of K = W,H inYy
K 
full income I, r = S,M.r 
In drawing implications from our model, we assume: 
The budget share of N is greater in married 
households. 
The budget share of Z is greater in single 
households. 
M 
Yw < sYw The share of the wife's earnings in full income 
w w 




N > at N The time share of the wife in producing N 
W, W, 
is higher in married households. 
M 
at- Z < 
S 
a Z The time share of the wife in producing Z 
""W, ~, 
is higher in single households. 
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APPENDIX B 
L ESTIMATING WAGE AND INCOME VARIABLES 
As discussed in the text, estimation of the marriage model requires 
measures of the value of the wife 
1 s time, the value of the husband's 
time and the female's transferred endowment as proxied by her father's 
income. The procedure for measuring the lifetime value of the female's 
time takes into consideration the censoring error of predicting a wage 
1
for all women based only on the working sub-sample. Since income in-
formation was reported for the husband and the father only if they were 
the primary income earner, we use instrumental variables predictions 
for these two income measures. Each predicting equation is discussed 
in tum. 
2. WIFE'S WAGE 
The measured market wage may understate the true value of time for 
non-working women. Hence the predicted value of the female's time is 
set equal to an instrumental value of the market wage if they are work-
ing in the paid labor force and to their predicted reservation wage if 
they are not working in the paid labor force. This procedure is based 
on work by Cogan (1975). The lifetime offered wage W0 is a function 






Following Mincer (1963), we define the experience variables as: 
(B. 2) Experience= Age - Schooling -6. 
1we do not correct for selectivity bias since there was little 
evidence of this bias in early work with these data. (See Hill (1979).) 
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The reservation wage is defined as: 
(B.3) W = f (schooling, husband's income, family 
R R business, home ownership). 
The choice to participate in the paid labor force in the current period 
relies on a comparison of the reservation wage with the offered wage. 
In order to estimate the parameters of the participation and wage frmctions, 
we must first specify functional forms and stochastic structure: 
(B.4)lnW = So2 Schooling+ $ Experience+ E~ 
0 
S01 + 03 
(B.5)lnWR = SRl + SR2 Schooling+ SRJ husband's income+ SR4 family 
business+ SRS home ownership+ ER 
where E and ER are independent and identically distributed Weibull 
0 
errors. The probability of labor force participation (Pi) is then: 
1 
(B.6) -(S X - SRX_)1 + e o o ~~ 
The parameters of the participation function may now be estimated with 
a logit technique since ER - E has a logistic distribution (McFadden0 
(1975)). Given the parameters of the market wage, estimated by OLS, 
·we may then identify the reservation wage function. These estimates 
are presented in Table B.l. 
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TABLE B.l 
ESTIMATED EQUATIONS FOR PREDICTING THE VALUE OF TIME 





















































1t-statistics are asymptotic 
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3. HUSBAND'S INCOME 
The predicting equation for the husband's income is based on a 
linear model in which the dependent variable, the natural logarithm of 
annual earnings, is regressed on three durmny variables indicating the 
highest level of schooling which the husband completed, and a set of dummy 
variables describing the husband's occupation. Since the husband's 
age is not reported, the wife's age serves as a proxy. A dmmny variable, 
equal to one if the husband has ever been unemployed represents disrup­
tion in work experience. Table B.2 presents the results. 
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TABLE B.2 
ESTIMATES FOR PREDICTING THE HUSBAND'S INCOME 
(918 OBSERVATIONS) 
Independent Variables Means Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept 13. 9613 232.26 
Ever unemployed (yes=l) 0.06 -0.1494 -2.91 
High School 0.38 0.1558 4.88 
Technical School or 
Junior College 0.11 0.2006 4.31 
College 0.24 0.3291 7.76 
Wife's Age 37.23 0.007744 5.59 
Occupational Variables 
Self-employed 0.19 .3033 8.46 
Professional 0.09 .1238 2.38 
Manager 0.07 .4282 7.75 
Salary man, large firm 0.16 .2125 5.09 
Salary man, small £inn 0.11 .1371 3.06 
Blue Collar, large firm 0.09 .07063 li51 
F 29.34 
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4 • F ATIIER' S INCOME 
The father's income is reported only for those women whose fathers 
are the primary income earner. Table B.3 presents the predicting equa­
tion based on the available sample information. The model for the father 
is similar to that for the husband. A variable equal to one if the father 
completed college represents the father's schooling. Dummy variables for 
seven occupational categories are also included. 
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TABLE B.3 
ESTIMATES FOR PREDICTING THE FAIBER'S INCOME 
Independent Variable Means Coefficient t 
Intercept 14.9156 75.24 
College 0.17 .1768 1.01 
Farmer 0.14 -.5442 -2.25 
Self-employed 0.24 -.09706 -0.45 
Manager 0.07 -.1705 -0.63 
Salary man, large firm 0.14 -.3225 -1.42 
Salary man, small firm 0.07 -.1919 -0.69 
Blue Collar, large firm 0.11 -.3936 ..-1.57 
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